Channeling human resources into occupations with high social productivity has historically been a key to economic prosperity. Occupational choices are not only driven by the material rewards associated with the various occupations, but also by the esteem that they confer. We propose a model of endogenous growth in which occupations carry a symbolic value that makes them more or less attractive; the evolution of symbolic values is endogenously determined by purposive transmission of value systems within families. The model sheds light on the interaction between cultural and economic development and identi…es circumstances under which value systems matter for long-run growth. It shows the possibility of culturally determined poverty traps and o¤ers a framework for thinking about the transition from traditional to modern values.
Introduction
Economic take-o¤s are often accompanied by pervasive changes in the values endorsed by people. For example, in western Europe the transition from a feudal to a capitalistic mode of production was accompanied by a transition from traditional to modern values; whereas the former emphasize land possession, religion, and combat skill, the latter praise work, education, and economic achievement. Also in the decades after World War II, considerable changes in values have been documented in rapidly growing economies such as the US, Japan, and western Europe. The concomitance of value change and economic development raises a fundamental question of causation. Scholarly views range from the culturalist one, according to which values are the engine of economic growth, to the materialistic one, which confers that role to technology and interprets value change as a mechanical adjustment. Far from being merely academic, the issue of the interplay of culture and economic performance has profound policy implications. In some areas of the world, mass poverty goes hand in hand with values and norms that are hostile to entrepreneurship and technical progress. Culture may or may not be a crucial factor behind the failure of development policies in countries caught in a poverty trap. If values do cause development, assessing their "malleability" could make an important contribution to the design of successful policies.
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The current paper o¤ers a tractable model of the interplay of economic development and value change, with a focus on the value attached to economic activities or occupations.
We introduce the concept of "symbolic value" to account for the observation that some personal characteristics, e.g. one's professional activity, seem to be invested with value by human beings. The value associated with those characteristics determines the self-esteem of individuals as well as the esteem that they receive from other individuals. Values are symbolic in the sense of being immaterial: they a¤ect the well-being of individuals without altering their consumption of material goods.
Formally, we shall de…ne a value system as a function that maps from a set of judgeable characteristics into a set of index numbers. Each "judgeable type" is thus associated with a scalar that represents its value. Value systems are individual-speci…c and determine how much esteem individuals allocate to themselves and others. In turn, self-esteem and the esteem received from others are arguments of an individual's utility function.
1 See Inglehart and Baker (2000) for a quantitative assessment. 2 See Stern et al. (2005, Ch. 9 ).
While we assume that the utility function is …xed, e.g. as the outcome of genetic selection that occurred in a very distant past, value systems are assumed to evolve through a process of cultural transmission.
3 Speci…cally, we focus on the benchmark case of intergenerational transmission within families, where parents choose the value system of their children so as to maximize their children's welfare. The set from which parents can choose is de…ned so as to capture the fact that it is easier to teach the values one endorses rather than values one has not internalized.
We embed this modeling of values and value formation into a standard endogenous growth model in order to highlight the dynamic interaction between culture and economic development. We address the following questions: Can values a¤ect growth in the long run? How does economic development a¤ect values?
The link between values and economic performance on which we concentrate is occupational choice. We posit that occupations carry a symbolic value that makes them more or less attractive. This assumption is corroborated by various kinds of evidence. First, it is consistent with the …nding of psychologists that occupation is a central category for de…ning one's identity. Second, it echoes historians' accounts of social life in medieval towns, where one's association with a given craft, often organized in a guild, was a distinct source of pride. Third, it is corroborated by econometric investigations of occupational and career choice. In an empirical analysis of the occupational choices of a cohort of U.K. graduates, Dolton et al. (1989) …nd that the social status attached to occupations is a major determinant of choice, explaining why some occupations are chosen by high-ability individuals despite relatively low earnings. A similar role for nonpecuniary factors is found in career choice. Arcidiacono (2004) …nds that the sorting of U.S. students into di¤erent college majors is explained by di¤erences in preferences for majors rather than di¤erential monetary returns to ability. Humlum et al. (2009) especially focus on identity-related payo¤s; using a combination of the Danish part of the international PISA study and register data, they …nd that identity-related attitudes are pivotal in shaping the educational plans of the Danish youth. These papers suggest that the monetary equivalent of the symbolic value carried by occupations is not negligible.
Furthermore, we posit that occupations diverge in terms of their spillovers on the productivity of other occupations. For instance, as documented by Murphy et al. (1991) , engineers and lawyers may contribute in quite di¤erent amounts to technological progress.
Because of those externalities, occupational choice can have an enduring e¤ect on the rate of economic growth.
Our model generates equilibria consistent with either the culturalist view, in which values have a long-run impact on prosperity, or the materialistic one, in which values do not matter. Our main …nding relates to the circumstances under which each type of pattern arises as an equilibrium outcome. The culturalist view of development is more likely to be right if the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption is large in absolute value, predictability of the economic environment is high, and concerns for social esteem are strong.
The elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption determines how, in a growing economy, occupational choices respond to wage di¤erentials across occupations as compared to esteem di¤erentials. If that elasticity is smaller than one, income di¤erences across occupations eventually weigh so much in terms of utility, that material payo¤s dominate career choices. Conversely, if the elasticity is larger than unity, symbolic values eventually dominate occupational choice even if pay di¤erences across occupations become arbitrarily large. In such a case, small initial di¤erences in terms of value systems can produce large and persistent di¤erences in terms of growth rates.
Uncertainty about the income opportunities of the various occupations enters the picture in combination with risk aversion. If uncertainty is large enough, parents strive to diversify their children's values in order to insure the children's self-esteem. As times goes by, generations become more agnostic about the intrinsic worth of the various activities, so that esteem concerns asymptotically evaporate. Then, long-run growth is entirely determined by technology.
A concern for social esteem fosters conformism in the choice of economic activity and can generate multiple value-led equilibria. It can exacerbate the e¤ect of initial values on long-run growth whenever the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption is larger than one.
If the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption is large, predictability of the economic environment is high, and concerns for social ostracism are large, culturally determined poverty traps can arise. While economic growth could be fast under a di¤erent value system, "wrong" values may have such an adverse e¤ect on the allocation of human resources that the economy fails to develop in spite of its favorable preconditions in terms of physical capital, knowledge, and protection of property rights.
Historical evidence of economies that might have experienced a cultural trap is reported by Baumol (1990) , who discusses the cases of Rome and China. Ancient Rome failed to put into widespread practical use some of the sophisticated technological developments that have been in its possession because of contemptuous attitudes of the upper class towards commerce and industry. By contrast, innovations spread like wild…re in Italy during the Renaissance, a time at which the upper class had the "right values", i.e., considered commerce and industry honorable activities. Imperial China during the Middle Ages is another example of a society where rent-seeking activities with high prestige delivered larger rewards relative to productive activities and that missed the opportunity of an economic take-o¤ in spite of its high level of technological knowledge.
Links to the literature
The current paper contributes to two strands of literature, one that studies the impact of social norms on economic growth and one that analyzes the formation and transmission of cultural traits. In the growth literature, Cole et al. (1992) propose a model where status determines an agent's mating opportunities and multiple status norms can be sustained as an equilibrium. Speci…cally, they contrast the properties of an aristocratic equilibrium, where birth determines one's position in the social ladder, and a wealth-isstatus equilibrium. Growth is faster under the latter because its social norm generates an incentive to accumulate. 4 The role of prestige attached to occupations plays a key role in the model of Fershtman et al. (1996) , where individuals can either accumulate human capital and become managers, or they do not accumulate human capital and become laborers. Accumulating human capital produces knowledge that raises overall productivity, so that economic growth is endogenous. Individuals care about their occupational status and the status of each occupation is assumed to increase with the average human capital of its members relative to the human capital in the other occupation.
Whereas Fershtman et al. assume that higher social status is bestowed on the occupation that enhances growth, in our model the esteem of occupations depends on the values that parents transmit to their children. Hence, in our model the symbolic ranking of occupations can but need not mimick their ranking in terms of contribution to overall productivity growth. This is in line with the observation that in some societies higher status is associated with activities that are unlikely to promote economic growth, like the clergy and the military.
Empirical evidence that culture has a causal e¤ect on economic development has recently been o¤ered by Tabellini (2006 Algan and Cahuc (2007) shows that social attitudes of second-generation Americans are signi…cantly in ‡uenced by the country of origin of their forebears. Using inherited trust as a time-varying instrument, Algan and Cahuc …nd in a sample of thirty countries that inherited trust explains a substantial share of economic development.
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Our model of value transmission is related to models of cultural evolution proposed by Verdier (2000, 2001) , 6 who study settings in which parents purposely socialize their children to selected cultural traits. This vertical socialization, along with intragenerational imitation, determines the long-term distribution of cultural traits in the population. Under some conditions, Bisin and Verdier's theory predicts convergence to a culturally heterogeneous population.
Our approach mainly di¤ers from Bisin and Verdier's theory in two respects. First, whereas Bisin and Verdier assume that parents want their children to have the same cultural trait as themselves, in our theory parents choose the value system of their children so as to maximize the children's utility. Second, the objects that are transmitted from parents to children are modeled in a di¤erent way. Whereas in Bisin and Verdier's theory parents transmit a preference trait, in ours they transmit a value system. The essential property of a value system is that, taking it in conjunction with a course of action, it determines the esteem enjoyed by the individual. We assume that parents in ‡uence their children's occupational choice through the esteem in which occupations are held (their symbolic value), in addition to other possible channels of preference formation that might also exist but from which we abstract (such as habit formation, for example).
The di¤erence between our value systems and standard individual preferences is not just a matter of interpretation. To the extent that the symbolic value of an occupation is determined by the beliefs of the whole society, and not only those of the agent who practices it, the transmission of values may be a¤ected by social externalities that must be taken into account by the theory.
This paper is also related to Zilibotti's (2005, 2007) model of the industrial revolution. Doepke and Zilibotti assume that altruistic parents select their children's time discount rate, which then in ‡uences their occupational choice. In their model, a low discount rate is a feature of the thrifty and productive bourgeois middle class, whereas a high discount rate captures the hedonism of the landed aristocracy. As in our work, 5 Guiso et al. (2006) o¤er an excellent discussion of culture as a determinant of economic phenomena and of the empirical methods that can be employed to identify the economic role of culture. 6 Bisin and Verdier's approach to value transmission is applied to trust and economic development by Francois and Zabojnik (2005). occupational choice is key to development and a¤ected by parents'incentives to socialize their children. The main di¤erence is that Doepke and Zilibotti assume that individuals only care about the pecuniary payo¤s associated with the di¤erent occupations, whereas we assume that they also care about their symbolic values.
Although not standard, the type of preferences assumed in our model has some antecedents in the literature. Kranton (2000, 2005) propose a notion of identity that shares some important features with our notion of self-esteem. In their theory, a person's identity is associated with di¤erent social categories and how people in these categories should behave. Violating behavioral prescriptions causes a utility loss and may produce responses by others who want to defend their sense of self. We follow Akerlof and Kranton's theory in that we generalize the utility function so as to include arguments that capture important nonpecuniary motivations of human action. We employ a different method to determine the prevailing norms of behavior. Akerlof and Kranton use sociological evidence to formulate assumptions about behavioral prescriptions. We derive those prescriptions as part of an equilibrium in a model based on individual optimization under constraints.
Our work also relates to Bénabou and Tirole (2006) who analyze issues of identity in a model where people value and invest in beliefs. Di¤erently from our framework, they focus on the individual management of beliefs and the cognitive mechanisms through which it occurs when the individual is unsure of his own deep preferences. Thus, while theirs as well as our paper endogenize identity-related payo¤s, the two papers concentrate on di¤erent mechanisms of value formation.
Symbolic values
Our approach to symbolic values is based on the following four assumptions.
Evaluative Attitude: Individuals pass judgments of approval, admiration, etc., and their opposite upon certain traits, acts, and outcomes.
Individuals evaluate bundles of judgeable characteristics (types). An individual's value
system is a description of that evaluation. Formally, we shall de…ne the value system of an individual as a function that maps the set of judgeable individual characteristics onto the real line. We take the set of judgeable types as exogenously given.
Social approbativeness: Individuals desire a good opinion of themselves on the part of other people.
The relevant human environment for approbativeness may be an individual's family, friends, colleagues, neighbors, or society at large. The desired approbation may involve a fear of contempt or indi¤erence, or a craving for the interest, approval, praise, or admiration of others. The current paper merely examines the esteem received by individuals from society at large.
Self-approbativeness: Individuals have a desire for self-esteem.
The desire for a pleasing idea of oneself presupposes self-consciousness. Humans are both actors and spectators of what they are doing. Since they are evaluative beings, they also judge themselves.
Consistency: The standards of approbation or disapprobation which the individual applies to himself are the same as those which he applies to other people.
This last assumption corresponds to the rule of judging yourself as you would judge of others. While psychologists have identi…ed ways of self-deception, i.e., methods that individuals adopt to manipulate their self-image, in the main individuals are subject to a consistency constraint. It is di¢ cult to systematically approve in oneself acts which one condemns in others, and when one does so, his fellows are quick to point out the inconsistency.
People's well-being is supposed to depend upon both self-esteem and the esteem received by other people, along with consumption of goods and services. When choosing a course of action, individuals compare the pecuniary return of actions and the esteem they carry.
Value systems can form within various socialization structures. This paper concentrates on the benchmark case of socialization by altruistic parents. A more general approach would consider multiple agencies of socialization like the school, the church, and the children's peers, in addition to their parents. We discuss this topic in the concluding section.
4 The deterministic model
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0; 1; ::1. There are overlapping generations of individuals living for two periods. In their …rst period, individuals are socialized by their parents; in their second period, they produce, consume, and socialize their children.
Speci…cally, at each period t there is a continuum of mass 1 of adults, indexed by i t 2 [0; 1], and a continuum of children, i t+1 2 [0; 1]. Individual i t is the parent of individual i t+1 . Adult individuals consume one homogeneous nonstorable good, which is used as the numeraire. Individuals have common preferences and specialize in one of two activities or occupations, referred to as a and b.
9 Each parent chooses his occupation so as to maximize his utility, and the values of his child so as to maximize his child's expected utility.
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A value system associates a non-negative index v(x) to occupation x 2 fa; bg. We impose the normalization
so that the value of an activity relative to the alternative, v(x) v(x 0 ), is between -1 and +1. Therefore, not only there is a rank of occupations with respect to their symbolic value, but also their di¤erence in terms of symbolic value may be more or less large. Each individual is equipped with a value system. We denote the value system of an individual i that was socialized in t 1 and is active in t by fv(a; i t ); v(b; i t )g. For a parent it may be di¢ cult to transmit values that are very di¤erent from his own. We therefore assume that a parent i t chooses the values of his child subject to the constraint
where parameter 2 (0; 1] captures the maximum distance between the parent's values and those of the child. This assumption can also be interpreted as one about the costs to a parent of socializing his child to values that the parent does not endorse.
Values determine the individuals' self-esteem and social esteem. To begin with, we merely analyze the role of self-esteem, while social esteem will be introduced in Section 8. 9 The model could be generalized to more than two occupations and possibly a continuum of them. However, the assumption that occupations can receive very di¤erent values in terms of status becomes less compelling as the occupations become less di¤erentiated.
10 An alternative modeling of family altruism is the dynastic approach where parents care about their children's utility and optimize over an in…nite horizon. If the altruism parameter is not too large, that approach would yield the same results as the current model. We opt for an impure altruism formulation because it reduces the technical burden and allows us to distill the growth implications of endogenous values in a crystal-clear way.
An individual's self-esteem is the value of his occupation according to his value system: v(x(i t ); i t ), where x(i t ) 2 fa; bg denotes the individual's occupation.
Individuals care about consumption and esteem. The utility of individual i t is given by
where
, > 0, captures utility from consumption and h(v(x(i t ); i t )) = v(x(i t ); i t ) captures utility from esteem; > 0 parameterizes the strength of the selfesteem concern. Assuming utility to be linear in esteem is only for the sake of simplicity; this assumption will be relaxed in Section 7.
Consumption equals the individual's income. The incomes of occupations are denoted by y t (x), x 2 fa; bg, and determined in the labor market according to
where n t is the number of individuals practicing occupation a at time t. We assume Y 0 a < 0 and Y 0 b > 0, and that Y a ( ) and Y b ( ) are bounded and equal for a value of n denoted by n 2 (0; 1). These assumptions can be viewed as a reduced-form model of a competitive labor market under decreasing returns to each occupation.
Economy-wide productivity A evolves according to
with g(0) > 0 and g 0 > 0. Thus, a is the growth-inducing occupation.
Equations (3) and (4) can be seen as a reduced-form model of endogenous growth.
In the Appendix, we show how it can be derived from a full- ‡edged model based on the distinction between traditional sectors and modern sectors that generate knowledge
spillovers.
An equilibrium is de…ned as -a distribution of values and occupations at each time,
-a path for the material payo¤s (y t (a) and y t (b)),
-for all i t , the occupation x(i t ) maximizes U (i t ) conditional on y t (x) and v(x; i t ),
-for all i t , the values v(a; i t+1 ); v(b; i t+1 ) maximize U (i t+1 ) subject to (1) and (2), -equations (3) and (4) 
Values and occupations in the short run
In a short-run equilibrium, the values and occupational choices of one generation, v(a; i t+1 ) and n t+1 , are endogenously determined, taking as given the previous generation's values and occupational choices. Let v(a; i t+1 ) Inf fv(a; i t ) + ; 1g and v(a; i t+1 ) Supfv(a; i t ) ; 0g, so that parent i t chooses the values of his child in the interval [v(a; i t+1 ); v(a; i t+1 )]. In a perfect-foresight equilibrium, each parent knows the occupation of his o¤spring. Hence, the parent puts the maximal symbolic value on that occupation, since this increases his o¤spring's selfesteem without a¤ecting other determinants of his utility. Formally, an equilibrium path necessarily satis…es
If is su¢ ciently large, parents are not constrained by their own values in choosing their children's values, i.e. v(a; i t ) = 1 and v(a; i t ) = 0. Then, in an interior equilibrium where both occupations are chosen by a strictly positive mass of individuals, the two occupations must yield the same income. Otherwise a parent would be able to increase his child's welfare by putting all the symbolic value in the activity yielding the highest income. Given our assumptions on Y a ( ) and Y b ( ), there is a unique equilibrium n t+1 = n and a corner equilibrium cannot exist.
Of course, the outcome n t+1 = n is identical to the one obtained in a model where = 0, i.e. agents do not care about esteem. Therefore, if is large, values do not a¤ect the allocation of manpower to occupations and exert no in ‡uence on the growth rate of the economy.
In the rest of the paper we mainly concentrate on the case where is small, so that parents may be constrained by their own values when choosing their children's values.
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In this case, the material payo¤s A t+1 Y a (n t+1 ) and A t+1 Y b (n t+1 ) could be di¤erent in equilibrium because some parents cannot teach their children a su¢ ciently high value for the activity with the highest material payo¤.
As noticed above, v(a; i t+1 ) and v(a; i t+1 ) are the only possible equilibrium values of individual i t+1 for occupation a. His parent will opt for v(a; i t+1 ) = v(a; i t+1 ) if
The left-hand-side of this inequality is implicitly increasing with v(a; i t ) whereas the righthand-side is decreasing with v(a; i t ). Hence, there exists a critical level for v(a; i t ) such that only parents with a higher value for occupation a choose v(a; i t+1 ) rather than v(a; i t+1 ).
We denote this critical level by b v(n t+1 ): Notice that the critical threshold b v(n t+1 ) is strictly increasing with n t+1 . Intuitively, if the size of occupation a is predicted to be larger, its income will be lower and choosing occupation a becomes optimal only for individuals whose parents have a stronger symbolic preference for occupation a.
The equilibrium level of n t+1 is then a solution to the …xed-point problem that the number of parents with v(a; i t ) b v(n t+1 ) should be equal to n t+1 . There is at least one solution by standard …xed-point theorems. There cannot be more than one solution since b v(n t+1 ) is increasing with n t+1 .
Therefore, a short-run equilibrium exists and is unique. Values and occupations satisfy (5) and (6); all individuals for whom (7) applies, choose occupation a and the remaining individuals choose occupation b.
To illustrate, let individuals be ordered according to their parents'values:
Thus, individuals with lower index have parents who put more value on occupation a. If v(a; i t ) is continuous in i t , the net bene…t from choosing occupation a can be expressed as
and B 0 t+1 < 0, so that the equilibrium is unique. If B t+1 (0) > 0 and B t+1 (1) < 0, the equilibrium must be interior and both occupations are chosen by a strictly positive mass of individuals; the equilibrium size of occupation a is the unique root of B t+1 (n t+1 ) = 0.
However, the equilibrium can also be a corner solution in which all individuals choose occupation a (n t+1 = 1 and B t+1 0) or b (n t+1 = 0 and B t+1 0). Notice that corner solutions could not arise in the case = 1.
Growth and values in the long run
The following result describes the evolution of the distribution of value systems within the population.
Proposition 1 Values are dynastic: if individual i t puts more value than individual j t on occupation a, then this will be true of all their descendants:
Proof. We prove that if i t puts more value on a than j t then this is also true of their children i t+1 and j t+1 . Then this will be true, by forward induction, of all their descendants. It is clear from the socialization condition (7) that if v(a; i t ) v(a; j t ), it cannot be optimal for i t to transmit values that induce his child to practice b while j t does the opposite. So either v(a; i t+1 ) = v(a; i t+1 ) and v(a; j t+1 ) = v(a; j t+1 ), or v(a; i t+1 ) = v(a; i t+1 ) and v(a; j t+1 ) = v(a; j t+1 ), or v(a; i t+1 ) = v(a; i t+1 ) and v(a; j t+1 ) = v(a; j t+1 ). In all three cases one has v(a; i t+1 ) v(a; j t+1 ). QED This result, combined with the assumption that v(a; i 0 ) is nonincreasing with i 0 , implies that v(a; i t ) is nonincreasing with i t at all times t.
We now turn to the central issue of this paper, namely the interaction between values and economic outcomes in the long term. We take as a benchmark the case where individuals are not concerned about values, i.e., = 0, and ask whether values can make a di¤erence with respect to long-run growth. If = 0, the arbitrage condition y t (a) = y t (b) applies for all t, implying Y a (n t ) = Y b (n t ) and n t = n . Then, as shown by (4), the growth rate is constant and equal to g(n ).
In order to assess the role of values in the case > 0, the concept of "family specialization" is useful. We shall say that a family i is specialized in activity x at time t if for all t 0 t, individual i t 0 practices this occupation and has all symbolic value invested in this occupation, i.e., 8t 0 t; x(i t 0 ) = x and v(x(i t 0 ); i t 0 ) = 1:
We denote by s t (x) the number of families specialized in occupation x at time t.
We are now ready to establish the following fact: Proposition 2 Assume < 1. Then, the families asymptotically specialize themselves in the same way as in the value-less equilibrium:
The long-run growth rate is the same as in the value-less equilibrium, g(n ):
Proof. On the equilibrium path one necessarily has
otherwise all individuals, irrespective of their values, would choose the same occupation, namely the one with the higher pecuniary payo¤. Since n 2 (0; 1), the pecuniary payo¤ of the chosen occupation would then be lower than the one of the other occupation, a contradiction. Hence, condition (8) must hold.
Condition (8) , < 1 and lim t!+1 A t = +1 imply that lim t!+1 jY a (n t ) 1 Y b (n t ) 1 j = 0 on the equilibrium path. This means that
This implies that the long-run growth rate is the same as in the value-less equilibrium.
This property also implies that for any " > 0, there is a T such that for all t T; n " < n t < n + ". The dynasties i t n " practice activity a after time T and invest symbolic value in this activity as quickly as they can, endowing activity a with all the symbolic value after time T + 1= at the latest. The dynasties j t n + " practice activity b after time T and have endowed this activity with all the symbolic value after time T + 1= at the latest. This proves the …rst part of the Proposition. QED Proposition 2 identi…es a simple condition under which the materialistic view is asymptotically correct. If the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption is smaller than one in absolute value, i.e., the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is larger than unity, the value system of a society at a given point in time will not have any e¤ect on the rate of economic growth that that society will experience in the long run. By the same token, two economies with the same fundamentals but with very di¤erent value systems will converge to the same growth rate. Thus, if convergence to the asymptotic growth rate is fast, there may be no point for policy makers to try to in ‡uence people's values.
As a counterpart of the materialistic result, we establish:
Proposition 3 Assume > 1. Then, the families asymptotically specialize themselves according to
where n could be lower or higher than n . The asymptotic growth rate g(n) could be higher or lower than g(n ), depending on the initial distribution of values. Skewing the initial distribution of values toward occupation a increases the long-run growth rate.
Proof. Let us introduce a variable e v t , implicitly de…ned by
where > 1. Since the l.h.s of (10) is strictly positive and converges to zero as A t+1 goes to in…nity, e v t converges to 1=2 from above. Suppose for a moment v(a; i t ) = e v t . Then, the r.h.s. of (10) is the utility gain for i t from choosing occupation a rather than b which is due to their di¤erent symbolic values.
If were 0, this would also be the corresponding gain for i t+1 . The l.h.s. of (10) is the maximum utility gain that i t+1 could possibly obtain from choosing one occupation over the other because of their di¤erent income. Now, let v(a; i t ) be arbitrary. If v(a; i t ) e v t , parent i t …nds it optimal to transmit v(a; i t+1 ) to his o¤spring, i.e., v(a; i t+1 ) = v(a; i t+1 ) v(a; i t ) e v t . Since e v t monotonically converges from above, e v t+1 e v t . By transitivity, v(a; i t+1 ) e v t+1 . Hence, also individual i t+1 optimally socializes his o¤spring to occupation a and the same applies to all future generations. Therefore, all families that satisfy v(a; i t ) e v t specialize in activity a in …nite time.
A symmetric argument applies to activity b. The parents with v(a; i t ) 1 e v t optimally transmit v(a; i t+1 ) to their children, who in turn satisfy v(a; i t+1 ) 1 e v t+1 and so on. These families specialize in activity b in …nite time.
Since e v t asymptotically converges to 1=2, all families must fall in one of the two categories sooner or later, i.e. We then illustrate the multiplicity of long-run growth rates by looking at the range of n that can be sustained in steady growth equilibria. Let us assume that at time 0 a fraction n of individuals has all symbolic value in occupation a and a fraction 1 n of individuals has all the value in occupation b. Then, this state of a¤airs persists for ever if a parent specialized in activity x has no incentive to shift the values of his o¤spring to the other activity, i.e.
This condition ensures that the parents maximize their children's welfare by transmitting their own values. For < 1 it de…nes a nondegenerate interval for n that includes n in its interior. The asymptotic growth rate is g(n).
We now come to the last part of the Proposition. Given some initial distribution v(a; i 0 ), let us skew it toward occupation a in the sense of (weakly) increasing v(a; 1 max
Furthermore, de…ne t fijv(a; i t ) e v t g and will also be true for all t > 0, so that t 0 t always holds. This implies that the number of families that eventually specialize in occupation a is larger under the distribution v 0 (a; i 0 ).
Hence, also the long-term growth rate is larger under that distribution. QED Propositions 2 and 3 can be related to Keynes'famous speculations on the "Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren", where he conjectured that if economic growth continues long enough, material needs will be satiated and human beings will devote themselves to non-economic purposes (Keynes, 1972) . This is the case, in the current model, if occupational choices are increasingly in ‡uenced by values as A t increases to in…nity; then, in the limit, all individuals choose the occupation with the highest symbolic value irrespective of material payo¤s.
A major insight from Proposition 3 concerns the possibility of a culturally determined poverty trap. Consider two economies with the same preferences, 1, and the same initial technology. Then, a small di¤erence with respect to their initial value systems may cause their income ratio to asymptotically converge to zero or in…nity: the low-growth economy is trapped into poverty by its cultural heritage. Policies that shape values can have a lasting positive e¤ect on growth.
The additivity of preferences plays a role in the analysis. If > 1 the marginal utility of consumption converges to zero, and so does the income utility di¤erential between the two occupations, which is therefore asymptotically dominated by the utility of status. By contrast, if < 1 the income utility di¤erential increases to in…nity and asymptotically dominates the utility of status, which is bounded. If the utility from consumption is logarithmic ( = 1), the long-run growth rate remains in ‡uenced by values even though the utility of consumption is unbounded. 12 If instead the preferences were, say, multiplicative (i.e., utility were given by f (y t (x(i t ))) v(x(i t ); i t )), then the strength of the status concerns would be independent of the income level, and status would matter for long-run growth irrespective of .
Uncertainty, values, and growth
Proposition 3 identi…es circumstances under which culture can be decisive for an economic take-o¤ in environments of complete information. We now scrutinize to what extent this assessment remains valid under income uncertainty. While the model of the previous section posits that parents know with certainty the income levels that their o¤spring can achieve in each occupation, technological shocks generate a considerable amount of uncertainty about those incomes. That uncertainty could result in socialization strategies that systematically di¤er from those derived in the deterministic model, with distinctive consequences for long-run growth.
In order to study the role of uncertainty, we modify equation (3) so as to include an aggregate shock in the determination of future incomes, i.e.
where t (a) = t (b) = 1 with probability 1=2 and t (a) = t (b) = 1 with probability 1=2, and 2 [0; 1) is the size of the uncertainty. 13 We assume that uncertainty about t (x) is resolved between period t 1 and period t: whereas individuals have incomplete information when they select the value system of their children, they face no uncertainty when they choose their own occupation.
When choosing his o¤spring's values, a parent i t 1 maximizes the expected utility of his child,
As in the deterministic model, we posit f (y t (x(i t ))) =
, where > 0 can now be interpreted as the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. While we also maintain the assumption that h(v(x(i t ); i t ) is bounded and satis…es h(0) = 0; h 0 > 0, we now posit h 00 < 0, i.e., the utility from self-esteem is concave. Below, we comment on the linear case.
12 Then, the range of possible steady states n satis…es j log(Y a (n)=Y b (n))j (1 ): Proposition 3 can also be generalized to utility functions f ( ) for which there exists some minimal consumption level c such that (y) 1 for all y > c, where (y) f 00 (y)y=f 0 (y) is not restricted to be constant. Also Proposition 2 can be generalized in a similar fashion. 13 The model of the previous section can be viewed as the special case of the current one in which = 0.
Before studying the model economy with values, let us consider the benchmark case where values do not matter. If h 0 = 0, the arbitrage condition y t (a) = y t (b) applies for all
. If t (a) = 1, then this condition is met by a unique and time-invariant n t , denoted by n ( ), where denotes the corresponding state of the world, n is strictly increasing in , and n (0) = n . If t (b) = 1, the size of sector a is given by n ( ), where denotes the corresponding state of the world, n is strictly decreasing in , and n (0) = n .
Absent a concern for esteem, in equilibrium n t takes the value n ( ) in states and value n ( ) in states . The growth rate varies accordingly. The expected growth rate is time-invariant and equal to In order to prepare for the next result, suppose for the moment being that = 1, so that parents are free to choose values in the entire [0; 1] interval. Then, individual i t 1 , optimally selecting the values of his child, chooses one of the following strategies: values specialization, i.e. the parent endows one occupation with all the value and the child chooses that activity with probability one; or, values diversi…cation, i.e. the parent endows each occupation with the same value and the child chooses the occupation with the highest income.
To ascertain when each strategy is optimal, let us compute the child's expected utility under each strategy. Let y ! t (x), ! 2 f ; g, denote the income of activity x in state ! at time t. Then, specialization in activity a is an option if putting all the symbolic value on that occupation induces the child to choose this occupation even if it yields a lower pecuniary payo¤, that is if,
If this condition is satis…ed, the parent can induce his child to choose occupation a by putting all the value on this occupation. Analogously, if
the parent can induce his child to choose occupation b by putting all the value on this occupation.
If condition (13) is satis…ed and the parent chooses v(a; i t ) = 1, his child's expected utility equals
If condition (14) is satis…ed and the parent chooses v(b; i t ) = 1, his child's expected welfare
Since we have supposed = 1, the parent can always select values that induce his o¤spring to choose the occupation with the largest material reward. Then, two cases are possible. Either there is an activity that delivers the higher income independently of the state of the world, or each activity maximizes income in a di¤erent state. In the …rst case, there is no point in diversifying values: the parent will invest all the symbolic value in the activity that dominates the other one in terms of income. In the second case, the child's expected utility amounts to
which only depends on values if h is nonlinear. Whereas in the linear case the solution to the socialization problem is not unique, under our assumption h 00 < 0, the child's expected utility is uniquely maximized by v(a; i t ) = 1=2 and equals
Therefore, if no activity dominates the other one in terms of income irrespective of the state of the world, the optimal socialization strategy could be to allocate an equal amount of symbolic value to each activity. This diversi…cation strategy could never be optimal in the deterministic model. Diversi…cation actually is optimal if the child's expected utility is larger in that case rather than in the specialization case, i.e., if
Turning to the general case, where parameter 2 (0; 1], we establish Proposition 4 Assume > 1. If is large enough, then the the economy behaves has a value-less one and the value systems of all families converge to f1=2; 1=2g.
Proof: At any t, individual i t surely chooses the occupation with the largest income, irrespective of his value system, if
If ! 1, then y t (a) ! 0 and y t (b) ! 0. Then, because > 1, one has f y t (a) ! 1 and f (y t (b)) ! 1. It follows that
so that if is large enough, individual i t chooses the occupation with the largest income independently of his values. By setting arbitrarily close to 1, condition (15) is met for all families and all periods. Then, in equilibrium the arbitrage condition y t (a) = y t (b)
applies for all t, implying that the economy behaves exactly as in the absence of values. If is so large that values do no a¤ect occupational choice, individual i t 1 chooses v(a; i t ) in the interval [v(a; i t ); v(a; i t )] so as to maximize the child's expected utility from self-esteem, which is given by
The solution is to set v(a; i t ) as close as possible to 1/2 subject to the constraint that it
jv(a; i t ) 1=2j jv(a; i t 1 ) 1=2j and that the value system of every family converges to f1=2; 1=2g. QED Hence, provided that the predictability of the future incomes from the two occupations is low, the equilibrium can be consistent with the materialistic view even if the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is larger than one. The intuition is straightforward. If the amount of uncertainty is large, the income di¤erential between the two occupations is also large and if this di¤erential increases, at some point an individual will choose the occupation with the higher income, irrespective of his values. 14 Anticipating this, the individual's parent will diversify the individual's values, thereby contributing to insure the individual's esteem. Hence, it is risk aversion with respect to esteem, or concavity of h, that can prompt parents to select a diversifed value system for their children.
If > 0 but not so large that material rewards are overwhelming, values can still matter for long-run growth if the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is larger than one. However, di¤erently from the deterministic case, in the stochastic case families do not necessarily specialize themselves in the long run. Speci…cally, we establish the following fact:
Proposition 5 Assume f (y) = log(y). Let the population at time 0 consist of three groups: n a individuals who put all the value in occupation a, n b individuals who put all the value in occupation b, and n ab individuals who attach the same value 1=2 to both occupations. Then, there can exist intervals for n a ; n b and n ab for which this distribution of values persists over time. The growth rate is stochastic and its average level increases with n a .
Proof: Fix strictly positive numbers n a ; n b and n ab that satisfy
and n a +n b +n ab = 1. The families that put all symbolic value in occupation a and always practice that occupation never have an incentive to deviate if
A symmetric condition ensures that all the families that put all symbolic value in occupation b and always practice that occupation never have an incentive to deviate:
The remaining families never have an incentive to deviate if
To sum up, all strictly positive numbers n a ; n b and n ab that sum to 1 and satisfy (16) and (17) describe an equilibrium con…guration if they also satisfy (18) and
It is easy to verify that there exist parameter constellations such that for each constellation there exists a set of triples (n a ; n b ; n ab ) that ful…ll all conditions. The equilibrium growth rate is then stochastic and its expected value is given by
Increasing n a necessarily increases the expected growth rate. QED Uncertainty about income opportunities can make families diversify their values. Increasing uncertainty beyond a certain point generates cultural convergence, i.e. all families eventually share the same value system and the esteem di¤erential between the occupations vanishes. This …nding suggests an interpretation for the diminished role of professional pride in modern as compared to some traditional societies. The pronounced craft honor in medieval towns, e.g. goldsmiths, barbers and merchants in Italian free city states, was likely to be supported by strong con…dence in professional continuity along familiy lines, which gave parents an incentive to invest in the symbolic value of their own occupation. Conversely, the industrial revolution and the liberalization of markets for professions implied a large degree of occupational mobility and a lower degree of predictability of future economic activities. This may have dissuaded parents to invest symbolic value unilaterally in their own occupation, since this would have created a psychological obstacle for their children to fully take advantage of new economic opportunities.
Social esteem
Concerns for social esteem can in ‡uence occupational choice and thereby a¤ect the growth prospects of an economy. The concept of symbolic value introduced above allows one to think about the social esteem that individuals enjoy because they practice a given occupation. The social esteem in which an individual is held may be de…ned as the average of the esteem granted to his activity over the whole society:
We may then write individual utility as
where z 0 > 0 and 0 captures the strength of the concern for social esteem. This parameter may be thought of as re ‡ecting both psychological predispositions and the intensity of social interactions. If individuals enter frequent interactions with a relatively small number of people over most of their lifetime, like in a traditional village, then one may argue that is larger than in the case of a loose network of anonymous, short-lived, contacts, like in a modern city.
The presence of social esteem generates an externality in the choice of values: while parents choose values so as to maximize their children's expected utility, they directly a¤ect the esteem that other children will receive. This externality entails a distinctive mechanism by which value systems and economic development interact, one that was absent in the model where the only symbolic reward of occupations comes in form of self-esteem.
To illustrate the distinctive implications of a concern for social esteem, we embed (19) and (20) To establish that result, consider the short-run equilibrium of the model with social esteem and = 1. In such an equilibrium, (5) and (6) apply with v(a; i t+1 ) = 1 and v(a; i t+1 ) = 0. Then, the self-esteem associated with occupations a and b are respectively given by 1 and 1 and the corresponding social esteems are n t+1 and 1 n t+1 . It follows that the net bene…t of occupation a relative to occupation b is
The …rst term in square brackets on the right-hand side of this equation is decreasing with n t+1 because the di¤erence between the income of type-a individuals and type-b individuals decreases with the relative number of type a individuals. The second term shows that the relative social esteem granted to occupation a is increasing with the number of individuals who value this occupation, n t+1 . If is large enough, the second term dominates the …rst one, implying that there are two stable short-run equilibria, one in which all individuals practice a and one in which they all practice b.
Thus, a concern for social esteem can lead to conformism. By choosing to invest symbolic value in the future occupation of his o¤spring, an individual reduces the social esteem for the other occupation and thus induces other individuals to imitate him. This may generate a bandwagon e¤ect in the formation of value systems and the choice of occupations.
15
Proposition 6 Assume = 1. Let the entire population at time 0 put all the value in the same occupation and practise that occupation. There is an equilibrium in which this state of a¤airs persists for ever if and only if > 1:
Proof: Suppose without loss of generality that the population is specialized in occupation b. Then,
must hold in the initial short-run equilibrium. This state of a¤airs can persist if
for all t > 0. Since n 2 (0; 1), it must be the case that
(21) is always met as A t increases to +1 if and only if > 1. QED Multiple value-led equilibria can persist inde…nitely if the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption is larger than one. 16 If is large enough, there exists both an equilibrium with a long-run growth rate equal to g(0) and one with with a long-run growth rate equal to g(1). Of course, g(1) > g(n ) > g(0), so that values matter in an extreme form for long-term growth in this case. Notice, however, that the interpretation of the current result is di¤erent from the one in the model with no social esteem ( = 0) and small. In the current framework, values do not matter in the sense that their initial constellation shapes the long-run behavior of the economy. They matter because the expectation of a certain constellation of values in the future and the desire to avoid their o¤spring incurring ostracism lead parents of all generations to instill values that validate that expectation.
Proposition 6 hints at circumstances under which values are responsible for big di¤er-ences in development between economies with small di¤erences in technology. Consider the case of two identical countries in a long-run equilibrium where everybody performs activity b, the traditional activity, and g(0) ' 0. Now conceive a development opportunity in the following sense: at some point in time, a technology shock raises the income level chose la plus importante à toute la vie, est le choix du métier: le hasard en dispose. La coutume fait les macons, soldats, couvreurs. "C'est un excellent couvreur", dit-on; et, en parlant des soldats:"Ils sont bien fous", dit-on; et les autres au contraire: "Il n'y a rien de grand que la guerre; le reste des hommes sont des coquins". A force d'ouir louer en l'enfance ces métiers, et mépriser tous les autres, on choisit; ... car des pays sont tous de macons, d'autres tous de soldats, etc. Sans doute que la nature n'est pas si uniforme. C'est la coutume qui fait donc cela..." (Pensées et Opuscules, Larousse, Paris, 39th ed., 1934, p. 28-29) . 16 As it is easily checked, they can also persist in the logarithmic case.
that can be obtained from activity a, the modern activity, i.e., function Y a ( ) shifts upwards in both countries. If the improvement of opportunities di¤ers in the two countries, condition (21) may be satis…ed after the shock in only one country. While culture and income will not change in this country, the other one will experience a cultural revolution and an economic take-o¤.
Conclusion
The endogenous growth model developed in this paper o¤ers a simple theoretical framework to highlight the interaction between economic development and value systems. People's economic activity typically results from the deliberate choice to practice a distinctive occupation, often for the entire duration of one's economically active life. For most people, work is one de…ning element of the self, not simply because a large fraction of one's lifetime is absorbed by work but also because it is largely through work that a person expresses her individuality. Therefore, economic activity is a central category for de…ning one's identity and a natural object of value judgements.
Our model explores the economic implications of the idea that people can invest in the value of occupations, i.e., they can in ‡uence their children's evaluations of occupations. Speci…cally, we have analyzed the evolution of value systems that arises when parents select them so as to maximize their children's expected utility. In our framework, economic variables and value systems mutually a¤ect each other. On the one hand, the path of income opportunities associated with the various occupations a¤ects the values transmitted by parents to children. On the other hand, both one's acquired values and others' evaluations of occupations a¤ect one's choice of economic activity; in this way, value systems a¤ect the structure of the economy and its development.
Symbolic values can have a long-term e¤ect on economic growth in our model. The culturalist view of development is more likely to be correct if the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption is large, predictability of the economic environment is high, and concerns for social ostracism are strong. In those cases, culturally determined poverty traps can exist. Under di¤erent circumstances, the materialistic view may be the correct one: technological change can be disruptive of value systems that existed for a long time and entail a process of cultural convergence.
The model in this paper may be extended in several directions. Given its stress on endogenous value formation, a further exploration in this area would be warranted. Values are not only transmitted from one generation to the next, but also within generations.
This horizontal socialization occurs in society at large via imitation and learning from peers and role models; "oblique transmission" occurs when values are acquired from nonparental adults.
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Horizontal socialization could be introduced in our model alongside vertical socialization. De…ne for each young individual a probability distribution over value systems: the individual's actual value system may be assumed to be randomly selected acccording to that probability distribution. The probabilities associated with the various value systems may be assumed to respond to both the values taught by parents and the values endorsed by society at large. More realistically, reference groups could be de…ned from which an individual is relatively likely to acquire values.
Following Bisin and Verdier's approach, one may further assume that socialization by parents is costly, and that parents can increase the probability of determining their children's values by investing more resources in socializing them. This ingredient may produce further insights into the value system of a society. To the extent that vertical socialization requires parents to spend time with their children, a substitution e¤ect might dominate by which more productive parents spend less time with their children and the social esteem of highly productive occupations is relatively low. If vertical socialization can be bought -e.g. services of private teachers and clubs are used to in ‡uence the children's values -an income e¤ect may dominate so that wealthier parents are more likely to shape values. This also obtains if productivity and capacity to transmit values are positively correlated. Then, the values of the a-uent may be overrepresented in society. 17 Models of horizontal socialization were pioneered by evolutionary anthropologists Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985) , who exploited analogies between cultural transmission and epidemics. The purposive aspect of cultural transmission was introduced later by Verdier (2000, 2001) . 
where p a and p b are the prices of goods a and b respectively.
An individual produces a quantity e A t q a at time t if he is active in sector a. The productivity level in sector b is constant over time and given by q b units of good. where q is a shorthand for (q a = ) (q b =(1 ))
1
. Then, the incomes to activities a and b can be respectively written as the product of Y a (n) = q 1 n n 1 ; Y b (n) = (1 )q n 1 n ;
and the productivity parameter
Notice that even though productivity grows in the modern sector only, income grows at the same rate in the two sectors because of the increase in the relative price of the traditional good.
